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Although a formally non-aligned country with strong economic and secu-
rity links to the Western powers, Sweden nevertheless developed an
expansive national intelligence system during the Cold War. After the
tumultuous shift of European security policy between1989-91, Sweden
realized immediate benefits in the area of national security; it went from
the exposed position of a front-line state in the Baltic to an embedded
position behind a new Cordon Sanitaire to the east. As other small
European countries, Sweden in the 1990s was thus faced with the task of
aligning its national intelligence system with new international premises
and a broadened, but largely unknown, future security agenda. The
attempts to reform its system offer insights into the process involved in
changing intelligence agendas and institutions, and into the problems
facing national intelligence policy caused by globalization and European
integration. 
The Challenge of Reform
The rapid, dramatic changes in European security and politics
in the late 1980s and early 90s had the effect of redefining
national intelligence, its goals, and its institutions. The Cold War
was over, and gone with it were the military structures and day-to-
day activity that Western intelligence systems had been designed
to survey and assess. If the Western defense establishments and
defense industries faced situations where much of their raison
d’être was gone, the same was true for the intelligence communi-
ties with no Cold War Order of Battle as a given priority. But as
traditional tasks lost priority, new tasks took their place. The post-
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Cold War world was not less complicated, and certainly not less
hazardous1.
The challenge of intelligence reform, however, was nothing
new for the 1990s. National intelligence systems in most Western
countries became increasingly outmoded in the 1970s and 80s as
new problem areas became apparent, from the oil crisis to con-
trol over technology transfer to growing refugee and illegal migra-
tion. 
The intelligence institutions were also faced with the double
dilemmas of maintaining democratic control while managing the
effects of technical intelligence collection. Once the peak of the
Cold War had passed in the1960s, the legitimacy of closed state-
in-state intelligence organizations was put in question.
Occasional intelligence ”scandals” continued to poison the polit-
ical climate and the democratic credibility of national intelligence
in countries such as Britain, West Germany, Norway, and
Sweden2.  Cold War methods and Cold War ethics, especially in
domestic intelligence, continued to bring discredit to all aspects of
intelligence. The stigma of illegality and oppression only started to
crumble in the 1990s. One cause of the change in climate was
the increasing practice of companies, banks, and public institu-
tions to euphemize their intelligence efforts by using more positive
or neutral designations3.
If ethics, legality, and political control were the overt prob-
lems, the imbalance between intelligence collection and intelli-
gence analysis, or finding questions for all the answers, was the
predominant internal problem facing the intelligence communities
and also the decision-makers dependent on its output. Already in
the1970s, the intelligence communities felt the impact of the
information explosion that society was to experience in the 1990s.
Few effective countermeasures to this phenomenon were devel-
oped; in addition, the increasing international tension and the
arms race in the late 1970s and early 80s further stressed the
need for more capable and effective technical means for collect-
ing intelligence.
At the end of the 1990s, the Western countries, as well as the
former east and central European countries in the process of tran-
sition, faced the tasks of reassessing their security priorities and
redefining their intelligence goals, both designed to accommo-
date the new ways of thinking about national security. 
The Swedish Intelligence System in the Cold War period
Sweden, being a formally non-aligned country conducting a
policy of neutrality between East and West, from the late 1940s
informally established close ties with a number of key NATO coun-
tries: the Nordic neighbors Denmark and Norway, but first with

























major recipient of US military technology and far-reaching securi-
ty guarantees that de facto gave Sweden a position similar to the
NATO allies.
Day-to-day cooperation developed mainly in the areas of
advanced defense technology and intelligence collection.
Sweden was well situated for the monitoring of activities in the
Baltic and Western USSR through radar surveillance, signal intel-
ligence, and sea/air reconnaissance. From the late 1950s,
Swedish intelligence (along with Norway) received significant sup-
port from the US. 
The Swedish national intelligence system, established during
the Second World War, remained basically unchanged throughout
the Cold War4. While the larger powers concentrated their intelli-
gence assets in organizations with a broad spectre of operations,
the Swedish intelligence community remained highly diversified.
The core of the system consisted of two centers for analysis and
national intelligence estimates: the Defense Staff Intelligence
Branch (later renamed MUST) and the Political Department of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This relation was at best politely dis-
tanced, at worst suspicious or hostile. Both tried to have the last
say in the assessment of any threat to the country. The bulk of
intelligence collection was carried out by two independent or
semi-independent institutions, the Defense Radio Agency, which
was responsible for all signal intelligence short of domestic illegal
radio communication (a task for the Security Police), and a secret
military intelligence bureau, which engaged in domestic and for-
eign intelligence collection; the latter’s existence was unknown to
the public (and most politicians) until 1973.
As the Cold War wore on, intelligence liaison became
increasingly important. Swedish intelligence collection in the
Baltics and from platforms to the east could supply neighbors and
Western powers with pieces of intelligence that they could not
readily collect themselves5. In exchange, Swedish intelligence
acquired advanced intelligence technology as well as parts of the
intelligence flow distributor among the intelligence services of the
NATO countries. 
Cold War intelligence was focused on external and internal
aspects of the perceived threat from the Soviet Union and its
allies. The State Security Police was the major counter-intelligence
agency responsible for monitoring and investigating crimes
against state security (espionage, infiltration, subversion, and sab-
otage). In the early 1970s, the efforts of the Security Police began
to focus, with growing emphasis, on counter-terrorism and the
monitoring of armed political groups of foreign origin (among
others, the German Rote Armee Fraktion, Palestinian PFLP, Kurdish






























A comparatively high priority during the Cold War was given
to counter-subversion, almost exclusively directed against the
Moscow-oriented communist party and its various genuine or sus-
pected front organizations. As in Norway, the ruling Social
Democratic Party in the late 1940s and early 1950s established
an impressive nation-wide intelligence network to counter com-
munist infiltration in the trade unions6. 
The public revelation of secret domestic and foreign intelli-
gence collection in 1973-74 resulted in the first comprehensive
efforts to evaluate and reform the Swedish intelligence system. The
parliamentary intelligence commission of 1974 concluded that
the Swedish intelligence system lacked guidance, effective politi-
cal control, and analytic efficiency, shortcomings that were shared
by many Western intelligence systems in the 1970s7. The commis-
sion of 1974 formed a parliamentary board to monitor the intel-
ligence services.  However, the role of the intelligence board was
limited by budgetary concerns, and operational control remained
within the services. 
The commission of 1974 discussed a new intelligence struc-
ture, but in the end it suggested only marginal changes. All
attempts to change the existing intelligence institutions turned out
to be a slow and complicated process. Institutions could be
assigned new tasks and new instructions, but with staffing and
internal culture left in place, little change occurred in the 1970s
and 80s. The Security Police successfully resisted repeated
attempts to establish political control. The parliamentary board
appointed to supervise the vast register of Swedish citizens
appears to have had very limited insight, and no impact on con-
duct. 
The role of intelligence in national decision-making
While large segments of the Swedish intelligence system were
engaged primarily in counter-intelligence and counter-subversion,
its main task was to supply the military and political decision-mak-
ers with short- and medium-term early warning. The role of the
intelligence system in the conduct of long-term policy and the day-
to-day implementation of this policy was utterly limited; the system
generated a plethora of “nice-to-know” intelligence, but it did not
necessarily fulfill the intelligence needs of top- or medium-level
decision making. 
The commission of 1974 also examined the function of this
early warning system. After reviewing the raw intelligence and
intelligence assessments from a number of international crises in
the 1960s, a commission concluded that the system really had
been effective8. The study revealed, among other findings, that
Swedish intelligence had monitored in detail the Warsaw Pact


























Czechoslovakia. However, it misinterpreted the political develop-
ments and thus was unable to predict the timing of the invasion. 
Although the intelligence system had ample resources for
intelligence collection, the analytic function as well as contact with
national decision-makers remained a bottleneck. The more com-
plex the tasks grew, the more obvious the limitations became.
Being mainly targeted against the perception of a military threat,
the intelligence system possessed only limited assets in the areas
of economy, trade, infrastructure, and social indicators. An office
for East European economic intelligence was established in the
1950s by the secret intelligence bureau and the Swedish Industry
Association, but the focus was on the defense-relevant Soviet and
WP economy; trading with the Eastern bloc remained a marginal
business for Swedish industry.
From the 1970s, the focus of business and national decision-
making was shifting away from the Cold War agenda, but intelli-
gence support in new fields was at best incidental. The conse-
quence was often no or inadequate intelligence support for vital
decisions and no early warning regarding crises outside the East-
West framework. One example was the multibillion losses suffered
by the Swedish government due to over-optimistic export credits
supplied to Swedish companies in Iran prior to and during the fall
of the Shah’s regime in 1978. This was probably neither a case of
inadequate intelligence information nor a lack of competent
analysis. The relevant questions simply were not asked9.
A changing security agenda
After the turmoil caused by the shift in European Security pol-
icy in 1989-91, Sweden realized immediate benefits in national
security, moving from the exposed position of a front-line state in
the Baltic to an embedded position behind a new Cordon
Sanitaire. The potential geo-strategic threat from the Soviet Union
disappeared, Soviet bases in the now independent Baltic states
were closed, and the once powerful Soviet armed forces were rap-
idly crumbling. In the late 1990s, the Swedish military intelligence
(MUST) concluded that Russia no longer possessed the opera-
tional weapons systems, trained units, or transportation to sustain
an offensive operation against Scandinavia. The threat was gone
for the foreseeable future; and internally, the Signal intelligence
complained that the level of routine Russian activity in the Baltic
was so low that the personnel manning the electronic intelligence
stations were not receiving adequate training. 
Although the traditional threat was gone, the intelligence
agenda was not empty. Just the opposite. Sweden in the 1990s
was confronted by a mix of intelligence needs, but without any
self-evident priority. Since a Russian invasion appeared remote,






























rapid mobilization, Swedish defense was based on timely early
warning (one to two years warning of drastic change in the
European security environment). The intelligence system was
relieved of most of its routine monitoring tasks and assigned a
new role. 
Bosnia and Kosovo not only revealed that European secu-
rity in the early 1990s was unstable; in addition, the demand
for collective crisis management pushed Swedish political and
military decision-makers into situations where they had to eval-
uate the consequences of Swedish military participation in
multi-national forces, such as UNPROFOR, IFOR/SFOR and
KFOR. Suddenly, detailed intelligence about remote conflicts
was crucial; for example, the government in 1993 decided not
to deploy Swedish UN forces in the Srebrenica enclave. 
Other new threats came as side effects of the political and
social changes in the East and Southeast. As most other EU
countries, Sweden by the mid 90s became increasingly restric-
tive toward spontaneous non-union migration and took strong
action to prevent and block asylum- or employment-seekers
from reaching the union area. A more hostile threat came from
the rapid increase in organized crime, facilitated by increased
freedom of movement and international business. 
However, the most profound changes in the intelligence
agenda concerned matters outside traditional security policy
and new transnational threats. Globalization, the de-regulation
of the flow of international capital, and Swedish membership in
the European Union in 1995 transformed the core of national
security, changing it to participation in a process of political,
social, and economic integration. The new short- medium- and
long-term intelligence assessments required for the conduct of
national policy were radically different from the old, traditional
- or extended - threat assessments. 
Attempts and limitations of reform
In the 1990s, an array of  “new” state intelligence services
was in place to offset the “new threats.”  Prompted by the free
movement within the Union, the custom authorities shifted their
emphasis from traditional border crossing control to an active
campaign against organized smuggling. The role of customs
service intelligence rapidly changed; as a result, the customs
criminal investigation branch added a new arm. 
In a similar fashion, the police created a criminal intelli-
gence service (CIS) designed initially to combat organized
crime, but also to fulfill the role of Swedish participation in the
Europe intelligence cooperation. Thus the national police sud-
denly had two intelligence institutions with overlapping func-

























for operations against armed (domestic and/or foreign) political
groups, the latter for operations against similar (often identical)
groups with criminal intention. As expected, the two services’
areas of responsibility often overlapped.  For example, in the late
1990s, Nazi extremists were engaged in a mix of “ordinary” crim-
inal acts and in acts of political and racial terrorism.  The securi-
ty police, however, strongly resisted suggestions to combine the
two institutions. 
In 1996, the Swedish government finally appointed a com-
mittee to survey “the tasks, guidance, and outline of the intelli-
gence service.” The committee’s task was to evaluate the impact
of the many changes in the international environment, the impact
of the new security agenda, and resolve the problems inherited
from the 1974 commission. The committee, chaired by a leading
jurist, included several senior intelligence officials but no repre-
sentatives from the private sector or the universities. The commit-
tee’s findings were published in March 1999 in a lengthy docu-
ment that was fully declassified, in itself an important concession
to the necessity for increased openness in intelligence matters10.
The committee’s findings concerned the nature of the changes
in national security and the problems involved in redirecting and
coordinating national intelligence efforts. National intelligence
tasks had, the committee found, become increasingly long-term,
geographically remote, and more demanding of analytic capabil-
ity. Any changes, therefore, should result in a more flexible nation-
al intelligence structure with full competence in areas previously
subordinated. But first, achieving coordination and guidance was
a primary objective.
Lack of coordination in the Swedish intelligence system had
been debated internally since the end of the Second World War,
but little had been decided and still less implemented. The major
reason was the strong inter-institutional rivalry between the intelli-
gence branches and the structures that they served.  The services
fought for “their” intelligence services; so did the joint defense
staff, the ministries of foreign affairs and defense, and the state
police. Although there were compelling arguments for a central-
ized intelligence agency, the politicians and senior military and
civilian officials feared the concentration of power in such an
organization and the subsequent lack of external control. Also, the
problem of inadequate political and legal control over the pow-
erful Security Police was still ongoing.
Although the 1996 committee was aware of the changes in
the international environment and thus the need for comprehen-
sive intelligence efforts in new fields, it failed to suggest any cor-
responding institutional reform. On the contrary, the committee
declared itself satisfied with the existing order (influenced, per-





























and the Military Intelligence Service (MUST) over the crucial task
of assessing future military threats). Instead, the intelligence serv-
ices should first recruit analysts with broad competence; then they
should compensate them so that they stay in the service. But with
business intelligence offering higher salaries, it is probably a vain
hope. 
Perhaps most surprising, the 1996 committee dealt only mar-
ginally with the topic of most concern to intelligence analysts; that
is, the future relationship between national intelligence assets and
goals and the growing number of serious non-state intelligence
entities. Much of the analytic capacity lacking in the national intel-
ligence services also existed in the intelligence departments of the
large corporations and in the consulting firms employed by them
and by the major financial factors. 
The outcome of the Swedish reform process in the late 1990s
was not impressive. Sweden adopted an intelligence coordination
board similar to that which existed in Britain for decades and in
the US for most of the Cold War. The intelligence community,
therefore, consisted of the same institutions created during the
Second World War.  Meeting the challenges of complex interna-
tional developments will thus continue to be an issue of division of
the labor, rather than one of integral analysis. 
Is a national intelligence system an illusion?
The attempts to reform national intelligence systems in
Sweden and the other small and medium-sized European coun-
tries are based on the implicit assumption that creating a new,
more appropriate system is possible. This may be so, at least in
theory.  National intelligence systems were once created to count-
er the extreme circumstances of the Second World War and the
effects of the Cold War. National security and national decision-
making in this period was fairly one-dimensional and coherent,
even in countries with an export-oriented market economy. 
Advanced business intelligence is still predominantly a com-
ponent in large corporations; there, the level of professional skill
is about even with and, in some instances, surpasses the tradi-
tional national intelligence institutions. Beyond doubt, the analyt-
ic capability and the skill to plan and execute mission-oriented
intelligence efforts are higher in large corporations competing in
the world markets. If national intelligence institutions are to
reform, they must learn from and adapt to the experiences and
methods of professional business intelligence.
But with long-term policy becoming less a restricted national
matter, so is national intelligence. Today, the European Union is
establishing a structure for crisis management that includes the
military capability to intervene in ancillary conflicts not directly

























not include - or rather is precluded by - the establishment of an
integrated European intelligence system for early warning and
evaluation of threats from local conflicts. Without such a system,
Union members must rely on the United States for intelligence col-
lecting, for intelligence analysis, and also for policy recommen-
dations. European attempts to intervene in the successive Balkan
crises of the 1990s are replete with examples of the hazards that
accompany intelligence voids and an over-reliance on US esti-
mates. 
Conclusion
Is a national intelligence system feasible in a world where
international structures, security goals, and intelligence agendas
are inconstant and fluid? The answer must be no, if national intel-
ligence systems remain the type of omnipotent, closed intelligence
bureaucracies of the Cold War. The answer could be yes if nation-
al intelligence is based more on cooperation and networks, more
on national goals that are supported by information networks and
by the analytic competence of an internationalized economy and
society. True, the key functions of national intelligence will still rely
on specific institutions for coordination and intelligence collection,
especially in the field of international crime prevention, counter-
terrorism, and the monitoring of incipient military threats. But to
achieve the ideal - insightful perception of the goings-on on the
international stage - still demands a surgical change in intelli-
gence priorities and attitude.
Notes
1 The debate on the changing intelligence agendas has been dominated by an
American perspective; see Roy Godson et. al. US Intelligence at the Crossroads,
Brasseys 1995. It is notable that a number of books published in Sweden have
focused more on strategic intelligence for private enterprise than on national intel-
ligence. 
2 See Stephen Dorril, The Silent Conspiracy, Mandarin 1995 that deals with the prob-
lems of legality and political control in British counter-intelligence and counter-ter-
rorism in the 1970s and 80s. 
3 The leading Swedish business bank Skandinaviska banken introduced an intelligence
department in the 1990s. The department was not new; it originated from one
established in the 1920s, but the name Internal Statistics was chosen as a euphe-
mism.
4 Swedish intelligence archives from the Cold War have only recently been available
for research. No major overview similar to the ones published on Norwegian and
Finnish intelligence yet exists. The Second World War is dealt with in Wilhelm
Carlgren, Svensk underrättelsetjänst 1939-1944, Liber 1985. An insight into the
secret intelligence service in the first two post-war decades is given in the posthu-
23
24
mously published memoirs of the director 1946-1965: Thede Palm, Några studier
till T-kontorets historia, The War Archives 1999. 
5 The first known photograph of the Soviet Tu 126 Backfire bomber was, for example,
taken in the mid 1970s by a pair of Swedish fighters that intercepted the bomber
on a trial run over the eastern Baltics. 
6 The former director of the secret intelligence service IB, Birger Elmér, in 1993
informed a government investigation commission that the Social Democratic Party
could draw on a network of 20,000 informers that covered virtually every state and
private enterprise in the country. This vast network was co-employed by IB. 
7 Den militära  underrättelsetjänsten. Betänkande av 1974 års underrättelseutredning.
Sveriges Offentliga Utredningar 1976:19. This is the declassified version of the
report; the full version is still classified. Some of the annexes were only recently
released (see below).
8 The historian, Stig Ekman, was not able to publish his investigation; classified as top
secret, it took him more than twenty years to get a declassified version released with
large deletions. This declassified version was eventually published under the title
Den militära underrätelsetjänsten. Fem kriser under det kalla kriget (The Military
Intelligence Service. Five crises during the Cold War), Carlssons, 2000. 
9 The US intelligence community experienced a similar failure, but with more devas-
tating consequences for national security. See Iran: Evaluation of US Intelligence
Performance Prior to November 1978. Permanent Select Committee of Intelligence.
US House of Representatives 1979. 
10 Underrättelsetjänsten - en översyn. Betänkande av 1996 års underrättelsekommitté.
Statens Offentliga Utredningar 1999:37.
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